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g a r e t h d a l e
Karl Polanyi in Budapest : On his Political and
Intellectual Formation
Abstract
A major thinker and inspiring teacher, Karl Polanyi’s contributions have long been
influential in a variety of disciplines, notably economic sociology and economic
history. Two of his innovations, substantivist economic anthropology and the
‘‘double movement thesis,’’ are recognized as seminal. All of the works for which
he is known, however, were written late in life, when in exile, and very little is known
of his Hungarian writings, virtually none of which had, until now, been translated.
Despite his fame, the biographical literature on Polanyi remains modest: some
studies provide invaluable insights, yet all are brief. This article attempts to make
some headway in remedying these lacunae. It sketches the contours of that
extraordinary historical-geographical conjuncture in which he was formed, and
explores his intellectual and political engagements in the Galilei Circle and the
Radical Bourgeois Party. It seeks in particular to elucidate the complex roles played
by questions of nation, ethnicity and class in the life of the young Karl Polanyi.
Keywords: Karl Polanyi; Hungary; Liberal radicalism; Jewish assimilation.
K a r l p o l a n y i is the author of a modern social science classic,
The Great Transformation, as well as a number of well-known and
widely debated essays collected in Trade and Market in the Early
Empires and Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies. These texts
were researched and written either during his second exile in 1930s
Britain or in wartime or post-war North America. German speakers,
in addition, are able to access his journalistic articles and sociological
and philosophical essays from his first exile, in 1920s Vienna, thanks
to the three-volume Chronik der groben Transformation published
earlier this decade by Metropolis Verlag. Not so well known, however,
are his Hungarian writings from the 1910s. Until recently, very few of
these had been republished or translated, although this is in the process
of being rectified. With reference to new translations of his Hungarian
writings, to interviews with his daughter, Kari Polanyi-Levitt, as well
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as to biographical essays by Ferenc Mu´csi, Gy€orgy Litva´n, Judith
Szapor, Erzsebet Vezer and others, this article sketches the contours of
that extraordinary historical-geographical conjuncture in which Karl
Polanyi was formed, and explores his intellectual and political engage-
ments in the Galilei Circle and the Radical Bourgeois Party.1 It seeks
in particular to elucidate the complex roles played by questions of
nation, ethnicity and class in Polanyi’s early life. In what manner was
he shaped by his Jewish heritage and by his bourgeois milieu? What
was his attitude toward the Hungarian language and nation? How did
these issues influence his political views and ventures? The essay finds
that Polanyi was unable to adopt a simple position of affirmation or
negation towards any of the identities under discussion. He may have
been quite the Hungarian patriot yet could not feel that he truly
belonged. Although never more than superficially interested in his
Jewish heritage, the presence of militant and vocal anti-Semitism in
pre-war Hungary ensured that it could not be forgotten or ignored.
And while his disdain for his class was heartfelt, this did not inspire
him to agitate for its downfall or even to join with those who wished to
epater la bourgeoisie; instead, he chose to apply his energies to
organizing a political party for ‘‘bourgeois radicals.’’
The extraordinary Polanyi family
In its rudiments, the story of Karl Polanyi’s early years is well
known. He was born in Vienna but when still an infant his father,
Michael Pollacsek, wishing to take advantage of propitious business
conditions in Hungary, relocated the family to Budapest.2 As a child,
Karl grew to know both the prosperity that fin-de-sie`cle Central
European capitalism could offer and the unsteadiness of the ground
upon which it rested. The educated Jewish bourgeoisie into which he
was born was economically and politically powerful, and sharply set
off against the mass of the population. Michael Pollacsek ran a railway
construction company, the income from which enabled him to acquire
a grand flat on a newly-built and fashionable boulevard, the Andrassy
1 The Hungarian writings referred to in
this essay were translated (or summarized in
English) by Adam Fabry and Kinga Sata.
Translations and summaries were facilitated
by generous grants from the Nuffield Foun-
dation and the Amiel-Melburn Trust. For
additional funding, I extend my thanks to
Brunel University’s School of Social Sciences.
2 Szapor 2005, p. 13.
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u´t, as well as a summer residence, and to satisfy the wants of his six
children – including a horse or pony for each.3 A team of tutors and
governesses was hired to provide private tuition until the age of ten or
twelve, when the children were sent to the best Gymnasium.4 When
the young Karl Polanyi walked out of his front door he would have
seen the continent’s first underground railway being built under leafy
Andrassy u´t, while in the distance smoke rose over the slums of
Csepel. Beyond the capital contrasts were starker still. In theory
serfdom had been abolished but in practice labour relations on the
landed estates had scarcely changed since feudal times. In some parts,
the diet was so poor that men’s voices did not break until the age of
twenty.5 In a land of savage poverty the Polanyi children were raised
in luxury; in a country with a literacy rate of only 40-50 %, they
received the best education that money could buy. It is, I think, safe to
suppose that Karl’s life-long dedication to the socialist cause was
based in part upon an early awareness of iniquitous social division. In
addition he was, one must assume, keenly aware of the instability of
the capitalist economic system, for in 1900 his father’s business
collapsed. For the Polanyis, straitened times followed: a descent, in
the words of Karl’s daughter, Kari Polanyi-Levitt, ‘‘from upper
bourgeoisie down into the middle class’’ (in the technical, not the
US, sense of the term).6
Through good times and bad the Polanyi family remained a central
fixture of Budapest’s radical intellectual scene. Karl’s mother, Cecile,
established a salon to which she would invite the brightest lights of the
Budapest intellectual scene, showcasing new talents and artistic
movements. A gifted and charismatic woman, she considered herself
an expert on pedagogy, gave lectures on political events – notably
Russia’s 1905 revolution – and was an early advocate of psychoanal-
ysis. (In a letter to Freud, Sandor Ferenczi described her as ‘‘a very
intellectual, very well educated lady, who has an excellent grasp of
the sense of psychoanalysis.’’7) In her radicalism and intellectual
bent, Cecile was typical of her family; indeed, one of the family’s
biographers has remarked that when one looks at the names on the
Polanyi family tree one is tempted to conclude that,
with only a little exaggeration, and counting friends, acquaintances and love
interests, the entire progressive counter-culture of turn-of-the-century Hungary
could be attributed to the Polanyi family.
3 Duczynska 2000.
4 Szapor n.d.
5 Stone 1983, p. 303.
6 Kari Polanyi-Levitt, telephone interview
with the author, 04.05.2008.
7 Szapor 2005, p. 52.
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One of Karl’s brothers, Adolf, was to gain a high-ranking position
in the 1919 ‘‘Republic of Councils’’ while another, Michael, would
achieve fame as a chemist, philosopher and liberal economist. Their
sister, Laura, was a pioneering socialist feminist, became one of the
first women to graduate with a Ph.D. from Budapest University and
founded an experimental kindergarten (later immortalized in the
memoirs of one child who attended, Arthur Koestler).8 A cousin,
Ervin Szabo, was the country’s leading Marxist theoretician, and his
closest friend, Oszka´r Ja´szi, was founder and chair of the Sociological
Society, a friend of the Polanyi family and an ally and former
schoolmate of Karl Polanyi’s Master’s dissertation supervisor, the
economic anthropologist Bodog Somlo. Karl’s schoolmates and
closest friends included Leo Popper, son of the cellist and composer
David Popper, and Georg Luka´cs; the latter, together with members
of his Sunday Circle (such as Karl Mannheim), were regulars at
Cecile’s salon. Luka´cs was the early flame of another of Polanyi’s
cousins, the artist Irma Seidler, whose sister married Emil Lederer –
a professor of economics at Heidelberg, referee to Karl Polanyi and
mentor to Mannheim and the ‘‘leading German academic socialist of
the 1920s’’9 – and whose brother, Ern€o Seidler was a founder member
of the Hungarian Communist Party (CP) and a minister during the
Republic of Councils.10 Karl’s other cousins included Od€on Por, who
emigrated to Italy where he became a syndicalist and, following the
First World War, an early propagandist for Mussolini’s fascist
movement.
The Pollacsek-Polanyi family, along with all of the friends just
listed, belonged to a distinct layer of Budapest society, the educated
Jewish bourgeoisie. In terms of the speed of its advancement and the
degree of its domination of a range of professions it was an
extraordinary social group. An indication of the pace of its upward
mobility is that in the ten years from 1885 the Jewish intake at the
University of Budapest quadrupled and from 1895 Jews comprised
almost half of the student body. Jewish ascendancy in the professions
was such that, although comprising scarcely more than a fifth of the
capital’s population, some two-thirds of all individuals engaged in
commerce and fully 90 % of those active in finance were of Jewish
extraction; in both categories, Jews were disproportionately situated in
the middle and upper brackets of the scale. They were also greatly
8 Ibid., pp. 2, 36, 56-65.




overrepresented in the legal profession and in political elites. The
percentage of the leaderships of all left or left-liberal parties – whether
bourgeois radicals, social democrats or revolutionaries – with Jewish
parentage was never below 40 and could reach as high as 60.11
Typically, Jewish professionals and businesspeople aspired to
integrate into the Hungarian nobility, but the conventions were
stringent: they involved not only the adoption of social styles and
mannerisms but also the tacit but firm expectation of conversion to
one or other denomination of the Christian faith.12 A majority of the
Jewish business class entered the nobility, which in most cases in-
volved conversion and Magyarization of the family name.13 (A well-
known case, due to his son’s later fame, was the banker Jozsef
L€owinger, who purchased a title to become Jozsef von Luka´cs.) Karl
Polanyi’s parents assimilated in most respects – his mother converted
to the Protestant faith and the children, albeit non-baptized, were
brought up as Protestants; and Christmas was celebrated in the
Polanyi household – but his father formally retained membership of
the Jewish community and refused to Magyarize his name, largely out
of protest against the ‘‘arriviste Jews’’ who would ‘‘change religion to
be fre`re et cochon with the native nobility.’’14
Whether or not they converted, Jews in Hungary did not consider
themselves a national minority and even for newcomers assuming the
Hungarian national identity generally seemed a straightforward and
comfortable process.15 Some evidence for this is anecdotal, but the
statistics on linguistic change are also suggestive. The language of
urban Jews (and of local administration) in mid-nineteenth century
Hungary had been German; it was the native language of 60 % of the
inhabitants of Buda and 33 % of Pest – including the Polanyis.16 By
the time Karl entered the Gymnasium, however, German speakers had
been reduced to a rump, even as the city’s Hungarian-speaking
population soared: to 80 % in 1900 and 90 % in 1920. An important
factor in this shift was the adoption of Magyar by Jews: in 1880, 59 %
of Jews gave it as their mother tongue, 30 years later the figure had
leapt to 78 %.17
11 Janos 1971, p. 35; 1982, p. 176.
12 Janos 1982, pp. 180-181.
13 Szapor 2005, p. 17.
14 Duczynska 2000, p. 303; Kari Polanyi-
Levitt, telephone interview with the author,
08.11.2007. For an alternative explanation of
Polanyi pe`re’s decision, see Judit Szapor,
interviewed in Cayley 2005.
15 Nagy 1994, p. 39.
16 Enyedi and Szirmai 1992, p. 67.
17 Janos 1971, pp. 36-38.
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The existence of popular and institutional anti-Semitism notwith-
standing, Jewish assimilation in pre-war Hungary could hardly be
described as forced. Jewish immigration and economic advancement
was positively welcomed by the bureaucratic state which, Andrew
Janos has described, reached out its arms to the bourgeoisie,
and was ready to protect it not only as an entrepreneurial class but also as
a religious minority. At a time when pogroms raged in Russia and Rumania, and
when even in neighboring Austria an irritating anti-Semitism was increasingly
accepted as part of political life, in Hungary Jews were extolled by the prime
minister as an ‘‘industrious and constructive segment of the population’’ while
anti-Semitism was denounced as ‘‘shameful, barbarous and injurious to the
national honor.’’
In the mid-1890s the Jewish faith was accorded the same privileges
as the Christian denominations and Jewish representatives were
granted seats in the upper house of parliament. The Liberal party
championed Jewish emancipation and was rewarded for doing so: half
of Budapest’s electorate was Jewish, and Liberal deputies were elected
with impressive majorities.
In spite of the absence of major institutional hurdles to upward
mobility and integration in pre-war Hungary the relationship of
assimilated Jews to their ‘‘ethnic’’ heritage and to their national
identity was far from straightforward. That full assimilation required
conversion meant not only the exclusion of devout traditionalist Jews
from the mainstream of public culture but that a barrier was
simultaneously raised to the social mobility of the unbelieving or
even agnostic. These faced a peculiar dilemma: they could ‘‘freely’’
become members of the Liberal or even anti-clerical establishment
but only by taking the clerical route, through conversion (and, ideally,
baptism).18 Refuse to do so and one risked pariah status; accept, and
the door to parvenu status was opened but at the risk of an identity
troubled by the invidious compromise that had been made. Either
way, the secularized Jewish intelligentsia faced a predicament, which
many of its number resolved by embracing internationalist ideologies
such as cosmopolitan liberalism and socialism. In this way Hungary’s
assimilated Jewry exemplified that oscillation between parvenu and
pariah with which Hannah Arendt characterized the Jewish experience
in modern Europe. As a result of their critical estrangement from
society and unique insight into the experience of oppression and social
exclusion the characteristic stance of Jewish radicals was that of the
‘‘conscious pariah’’: they spurned the sycophancy of their conservative
18 Janos 1982, p. 181.
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fellows, and rejected not only the chauvinism of aristocratic Hungary
but also Zionist separatism in favour of a ‘‘universal humanism.’’19 In
contrast to ‘‘those who bought themselves into baronies,’’ Gy€orgy
Litva´n has explained, ‘‘leaders of the counterculture, and the Jewish
intelligentsia within it, did not seek assimilation by artificial means, but
rather sought to create an order in which the whole issue of assimilation
was irrelevant’’20 – a political community based on universalist criteria
rather than on the tribal particularism of the nation state. With regard
to the ‘‘unique insight into the experience of oppression,’’ however, one
blind spot existed: towards their own ethnic group, particularly its
traditionalist variants. Even radicals such as Ja´szi – a convert to
Calvinism – spoke of traditionalist Jews as superstitious and ‘‘cowardly
wearers of the yellow patch’’ and lamented ‘‘the defects of the Jewish
character ingrained by centuries of ghetto life.’’21 Karl Polanyi, in his
daughter’s words, took a similarly ‘‘politically incorrect’’ view. In
connection with his ‘‘desire to become Hungarian,’’ he bemoaned the
fact that Jews ‘‘have a divided loyalty: to their tribe and their country,’’
and ‘‘looked down in particular on those Jews who came from the
ghetto and retained their culture.’’22
As regards national identity, citizens of Jewish extraction were
known for their patriotism and Polanyi was no exception. That
patriotism, however, could hardly be organic or unreserved; indeed,
there is a sense in which he was an emigre in his own country. ‘‘I never
quite belonged to Hungary,’’ he wrote his brother Michael towards
the end of his life;
The first language I heard spoken was German, I suppose; the second was
English; Hungarian reached me together with French. That’s why my roots
were not in the Hungarian soil, which I did not touch until the age of 12, in the
Gymnasium.23
Despite – or perhaps because – of this ‘‘deficit’’ he was, at that same
age, quite the Hungarian chauvinist. ‘‘Blimpian’’ was the term he used
in retrospect, as he recalled his reaction upon discovering that many of
the country’s inhabitants were national minorities: ‘‘Unable to speak
Hungarian?! And yet they claim the right to live in ‘our’ country, to eat
‘our’ bread?’’24 But this was of course an eccentricity of childhood and
19 Piterberg 2008.
20 Quoted in Janos 1982, p. 181.
21 Ibid., p. 181.
22 Kari Polanyi-Levitt, interview with the
author, Montreal 14.07.2006.
23 57-8, Correspondence: Karl Polanyi –
Michael Polanyi. Karl to Michael 21.10.1959.
References of the form ‘‘1-11’’ denote folders
and files in the Karl Polanyi Archive, Con-
cordia University.
24 Polanyi 1946, p. 94.
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soon yielded to the perspective that he retained throughout his adult
life, summarized by his daughter as ‘‘opposition to the chauvinist
nationalism of the ruling circles and the bourgeoisie, but wholehearted
enthusiasm for the Hungarian nation.’’25
Disruptions of liberal hegemony
When considering the Polanyi household in the round, one gains
a sense of a family that was at society’s centre yet also at its margins.
Being talented, sociable, and principled, they were highly regarded
within the Budapest intelligentsia. Yet they felt kinship with neither
traditionalist Jews nor the Hungarian nobility, and not much more
with the bourgeois Jewish mainstream. According to Karl’s wife,
Ilona Duczynska, his father ‘‘lived by his creed of Puritanism,
positivism, progress, the scientific outlook, democracy, and the eman-
cipation of women’’ and had little time for the gentrified Jewish bour-
geois whose ingratiating eagerness to assimilate into the Hungarian
nobility led them to adopt the elitism, snobbery and assorted vices of
that class. His family existed ‘‘in artificial isolation in a social no-
man’s land, virtually strangers in their own country.’’26 The solidarity
they did feel was with ‘‘marginal’’ folk – such as the fugitive Russian
revolutionaries who would turnup overnight at their home.
In their existence on a margin within a minority the Polanyi clan’s
experience accords with the explanation offered by Isaac Deutscher
for the fact that such a remarkable number of revolutionaries of
modern thought were Jewish. Deutscher had in mind Spinoza, Heine,
Marx, Freud, Luxemburg and Trotsky but the thesis applies equally
to a Polanyi or Luka´cs. The minds of these individuals matured
where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and fertilized each other.
They lived on the margins or in the nooks and crannies of their respective
nations. Each of them was in society and yet not in it, of it and yet not of it. It
was this that enabled them to rise in thought above their societies, above their
nations, above their times and generations, and to strike out mentally into wide
new horizons and far into the future.
Perched precariously on the borderlines of various civilizations,
religions and national cultures, they were keenly alert to elements
of contradiction and flux. Their attention ineluctably drawn to the
25 Kari Polanyi-Levitt, telephone inter-
view with the author, 08.11.2007.
26 Duczynska 2000, pp. 303-307.
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dynamic elements of reality, they could ‘‘comprehend more clearly the
great movement and the great contradictoriness of nature and society.’’27
A not dissimilar idea has been developed more recently by Mary
Gluck, in Georg Luka´cs and his Generation, 1900-1918. For her,
a segment of Budapest’s Jewish intelligentsia at the turn of the
century was peculiarly alive to the sense of fragmentation that
characterizes modern and, still more, modernizing societies. Where
for Deutscher the marginal Jewish experience promotes a sensitivity
to social change and contradiction, Gluck’s emphasis is that it
stimulates a search for community. The Budapest Jews she surveys
attached themselves to wider groupings, such as communism or social
democracy, the avant-garde and Bauhaus, and formed imaginary
allegiances to communities elsewhere. Is it mere coincidence that
the social theorists among them turned their attention to experiences
of detachment (Karl Mannheim’s ‘‘free-floating intellectuals’’) or to
the dialectic of alienation and community (Luka´cs, Polanyi)?
Gluck’s concern, unlike Deutscher’s, is with a very specific group:
predominantly Jewish Hungarian intellectuals born in, or just a few
years outside of, the 1880s. Alongside Luka´cs, Mannheim and the
Polanyi siblings this ‘‘Great Generation’’ included Oszkar Ja´szi, Ervin
Szabo, and the art critics Arnold Hauser and Bela Bala´zs as well as
gentile but pro-Jewish personalities such as the poet Endre Ady and
composers Bela Bartok and Zolta´n Koda´ly. It was an age group that
faced markedly different circumstances to their parents and responded
in singular and quite extraordinary ways.
The elder generation had come of age in an epoch in which life was
becoming steadily more secure for the Jews of Budapest. In the third
quarter of the 19th century British hegemony at the global level and
domestic agricultural prosperity underpinned a pronounced liberal
trend in economic policy. In politics, Hungarian liberalism experi-
enced its golden age from 1867. Freedoms of press, speech, assembly
and religion were granted, and Judaism was put on an equal footing
with other religions. Liberals – including Polanyi’s father – believed
sanguinely that Hungary was securely positioned on the highway to
modernity headed in the direction of Western Europe, the signposts
towards which read laissez-faire and free trade, gradual democratiza-
tion, civil liberties and tolerance. For bourgeois Jews of his generation
full equality was not yet in their grasp but life was manifestly more
tolerable than it had been for their parents and grandparents. They
27 Deutscher 1968, p. 27.
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had little but scorn for those who adhered to an ethnic Jewish identity,
seeing it as antithetical to modernity, patriotism and liberalism.
As we have seen, in many respects Karl adopted the attitudes of his
parents and their peers. But his generation could not share the same
faith in linear liberal progress. The final quarter of the 19th century
witnessed the first throes of what one historian, paraphrasing Danger-
field, has called ‘‘the strange death of Liberal Europe.’’28 During the
‘‘Great Depression’’ (1873-1896) the liberal consensus on the benefits
of international trade and investment evaporated. As tariffs, cartels
and other protectionist measures proliferated a new form of ‘‘orga-
nized capitalism’’ emerged, centred upon interventionist economic
policy and close cooperation between banks and states. Imperial
rivalries intensified, involving colonial annexations, an arms race and
diplomatic tensions that culminated in the general conflagration of
1914-1918. Middle-class nationalist movements agitated against im-
migration and against oppressed nations’ demands for political
equality. The growth of trade unions and social-democratic parties
rattled the self-assurance of bourgeois Europe and pushed questions
of welfare and democracy to the fore. Around 1905, trade-union and
socialist movements led revolts in many parts of the continent, several
of which brought left-liberal technocratic governments into office.
Against this backdrop, classical liberalism faced a challenge from
within, by radical outriders from the liberal camp. Whereas classical
liberals were free-traders, Christians, believers in a strong centralized
state and supporters of only a minimal franchise, there were also, as
Norman Stone describes,
middle-class liberals who took a quite different view. They were quite violently
anti-aristocratic and they regarded religion as mumbo-jumbo. They advocated
divorce, and wholly secular education; sometimes, they supported the emanci-
pation of women; . . . they wanted the franchise to be extended. They were, on
the whole, contemptuous of the past and confident of a progressive future, for
which the lumber of past centuries should unhesitatingly be swept aside.29
Ja´szi, Polanyi, and many, probably a majority, of the ‘‘Great
Generation’’ of Budapest artists and intellectuals belonged unambig-
uously to this current.
In the Habsburg Empire the ‘‘death’’ of liberalism took an especially
dramatic form. With regard to its Western half the classic description is
contained in Carl Schorske’s Fin-de-sie`cle Vienna, with its eloquent
portrayal of the social blowback that followed upon liberal reforms.
28 Stone 1983. 29 Ibid., p. 43.
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During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the program which the
liberals had devised against the upper classes occasioned the explosion of the
lower. The liberals succeeded in releasing the political energies of the masses,
but against themselves rather than against their ancient foes. . . . A German
nationalism articulated against aristocratic cosmopolitans was answered by
Slavic patriots clamouring for autonomy. . . . Laissez faire, devised to free the
economy from the fetters of the past, called forth the Marxist revolutionaries of
the future. Catholicism, routed from the school and the courthouse as the
handmaiden of aristocratic oppression, returned as the ideology of peasant and
artisan, for whom liberalism meant capitalism and capitalism meant Jew. . . . Far
from rallying the masses against the old ruling class above, then, the liberals
unwittingly summoned from the social deeps the forces of a general disintegra-
tion. Strong enough to dissolve the old political order, liberalism could not
master the social forces which that dissolution released and which generated new
centrifugal thrust under liberalism’s tolerant but inflexible aegis.30
This sense of an old order disintegrating concurrently with the
foundering of the accustomed alternative, liberalism, formed the
experiential backdrop to the modernist moment: the flourishing of
movements in the arts, sciences and in politics that spoke the language
of experimentation, iconoclasm and radical regeneration.
The sense of upheaval, of crisis, of new beginnings that famously
characterized fin-de-sie`cle Vienna was strongly present in Budapest
too. The golden age of Hungarian liberalism was approaching its end.
In the wake of the Europe-wide agricultural crisis liberal economic
policy was reversed and protectionism gained ground. The brunt of
a 50 % fall in agricultural prices was imposed upon agrarian wage
earners with the assistance of a series of labour-repressive measures,
including a law of 1878 that imposed humiliating conditions on
seasonal labourers by exempting their masters from legal liability
for ‘‘minor acts of violence.’’31 This was followed, at the end of the
century, by an Act of Parliament – dubbed by contemporaries the
Slave Law – that outlawed industrial action by agricultural labourers,
made them criminally liable for breaches of seasonal contracts, and
provided that fugitive labourers be returned to their place of work by
the gendarmerie. Significantly, Liberals generally supported these
measures, on the grounds that they contributed to the restoration of
profit margins.
By the turn of the century, classical liberalism was no longer the
buoyant creed that it had been when Polanyi’s father was coming of
age. Whereas in 1870 most citizens of Budapest had welcomed
economic liberalization by 1900, according to historian John Luka´cs,
30 Schorske [1961] 1980, p. 117. 31 Janos 1982, pp. 129-131.
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more and more people were inclined to think that economic liberalism,
capitalism and freedom of enterprise profited some people but not others; that
the profits of a minority were accumulating at the expense of a majority.32
The liberal faith that social progress would arrive courtesy of
capitalist development was evaporating. Instead, commodification and
marketization seemed to beget all manner of disagreeable phenomena –
the destruction of rural communities, exploitation, moral regression
and philistinism. On the political left, opposition to these ills co-
alesced around the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. The
labour movement led the campaign for democracy, and this helped
forge the young Karl Polanyi’s life-long identification with it.
(Something of the tone can be seen in a letter he wrote Luka´cs
recalling his sentiments on the occasion of a general strike and mass
rally demanding the extension of the franchise: ‘‘my cheeks burned . . .
as my eyes followed the endless red armies marching right into the
future.’’33) The campaign, however, did not experience the democratic
breakthrough that the street protests and industrial action of 1905 in
Austria had achieved. Not only was the Hungarian labour movement
weaker, but the threat to the central state’s territorial claims posed by
democratization in areas with minority nationalities was greater. On
the political right, anti-Liberal sentiment amongst peasants alloyed
with anti-democratic and anti-socialist reaction amongst the nobility
and petit bourgeoisie to forge a conservative anti-Semitic coalition,
fronted from 1895 by the Catholic People’s Party. Although not
a successful mass organization in the style of Karl Lueger’s Christian
Social movement in Austria, and arguably little more than ‘‘an
appendage of aristocratic politics in the shadow of a powerful bu-
reaucratic machine,’’34 the People’s Party did help to rally chauvinist
sentiment and to refashion anti-semitism from a religious movement
directed explicitly at practising, non-assimilated Jews into a socio-
political movement that targeted the assimilated too. By 1900 ‘‘chau-
vinism’’ was in common use as an appreciative term by many
a Hungarian politician and journalist.35
The new conservative anti-semitism was nowhere more visible than
at the University of Budapest’s Faculty of Law, at which Polanyi
studied from 1903 to 1907. In 1896 Budapest University students had
sent a telegram of approbation to Karl Lueger – despite his well-
known anti-Hungarian prejudice.36 In 1899 a movement of ‘‘Christian
32 LukA´cs 1993, p. 183.
33 LukA´cs 1986, p. 39.
34 Janos 1982, p. 148.
35 LukA´cs 1993, p. 128.
36 HorvA´th 1966, p. 62.
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awakening’’ had attracted a considerable portion of the student body.
Then, during Polanyi’s student years, the polarization between
conservative and radical (predominantly Jewish) students reached
fever pitch, and he himself was expelled from university for fighting
with members of a rival student organization.
Free radicals
As Zolta´n Horva´th and Mary Gluck have documented, the his-
torical conditions encountered by Karl Polanyi’s generation diverged
conspicuously from those faced by their parents. Both generations, it
is true, came of age during that protracted period of rapid socioeco-
nomic change which the sociologist Ferdinand T€onnies referred to as
the ‘‘great transformation’’ from feudal agrarian Gemeinschaft to
industrial capitalist Gesellschaft, but Karl and his generation encoun-
tered darkening trends, not least of which anti-Semitism and chauvinism,
that bore a warning: the progressive potential of the transition to
Gesellschaft, of Enlightenment and liberal values, could not be taken
for granted. In its final two decades the Habsburg Empire experienced
one crisis after another. Having restructured and successfully in-
corporated its erstwhile liberal opponents, the absolutist ancien
regime faced the rise of a new force, the labour movement, which
pressed for universal suffrage – successfully in Austria but not in
Hungary. There, conditions in agriculture remained semi-feudal,
social divisions were crass, and the landowning aristocracy remained
the dominant force in the state. The parliament had a very restricted
franchise: for the regions studied by Da´niel Szabo the electorate in
1890 represented 5.2 % of the population, rising to 7 % in 1910.37 In
effect, proletariat and peasantry were excluded from representation in
Parliament, as were the minority nationalities (in some cases partially,
in others completely). Given the numerical weight of non-Magyars in
the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy, questions of nationality and
democracy were intimately connected: conservative patriots could
successfully silence nationalistically-minded Hungarian democrats
with the warning that universal suffrage would imperil Magyar
dominance.38 The Liberal party, its backbone formed by the
arch-nationalist gentry, was anti-democratic and supported fanatically
37 As a percentage of the workforce the
equivalent figures were 14.8 and 16.7. See
Szabo 1989, pp. 181-204.
38 Polanyi 1946, p. 96.
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repressive measures against the agricultural labour force.39 The Social
Democratic Party was more cautious and legalistic than were any of its
Second International sister parties. As a result, Michael L€owy has
observed, the Hungarian intelligentsia was to a remarkable extent free
from attachment to major socio-economic classes. The moderate wing
was deprived of its natural ally, the liberal bourgeoisie, which clung
tightly to the coat-tails of the gentry, while the revolutionary wing
could not feel at home in the main organization of labour, the Social
Democratic Party.40
In this light one can see why fin-de-sie`cle Hungary produced more
than its fair share of frustrated intellectuals. The generation of radicals
who came of age at around 1900 were painfully aware of their
country’s backwardness yet were closely connected to innovative
political and intellectual movements elsewhere in Europe. They were
‘‘more thoroughly disenchanted with the present and more passion-
ately invested in the future’’ than their West European counterparts,
in the judgement of Mary Gluck. As East Europeans ‘‘they were
invariably somewhat outside West European developments, . . . and as
Hungarian nationals they were increasingly shut out of an inward-
looking and increasingly anti-Semitic national community.’’ Whereas
for their parents’ generation, Hungarian nationalism was linked to
liberalism and progress, they were raised as patriots at a time when
nationalism was becoming increasingly strident, xenophobic and
provincial. Gluck’s book focuses upon Georg Luka´cs, and Karl
Polanyi does not enter her discussion. However, the connections that
she draws between the sense of alienation felt by Luka´cs and the other
members of his Sunday Circle and the spirit that guided their
intellectual and political endeavours could apply equally to Polanyi.
‘‘Their inability to find genuine roots in the stony soil of turn-of-the-
century Hungary,’’ she speculates, ‘‘produced in many not detach-
ment but a strong nostalgia for the possibility of a community that
kept eluding them.’’41 They reacted against the materialistic, utilitarian
civilization of the late 19th century with passionate hatred, convinced
that ‘‘the dubious material gains of progress have been made at the
price of stupendous spiritual loss.’’42 They shared with conservatives an
intense and melancholic awareness of ‘‘life as it was, and is not, and
should be.’’ Unlike conservatives, however, they made no attempt to
recapture the traditions of bygone ages. They seemed to possess
39 Stone 1983, p. 317.
40 L€owy 1979, p. 73.
41 Gluck 1985, p. 73.




a deeper, more tragic sense of separation from the past, and sensed
that its forms and conventions were irretrievable and probably
inappropriate for modern man. To borrow a phrase from Robert
Sayre and Michael L€owy, they may be classified alongside Ferdinand
T€onnies as ‘‘resigned Romantics.’’ (And the German sociologist’s
influence was potent, both on the young Luka´cs and, more enduringly,
on Polanyi).43 For them, the past became an instrument of criticism
against the present, as well as a model of integrity and synthesis for
the future. Like the Romantics, they searched in the past – usually the
Middle Ages or Ancient Greece – for ideal instances of non-alienated
cultures ‘‘when individuals supposedly still felt that their inner selves
were adequately reflected by the cultural world around them.’’44 Like
their modernist counterparts elsewhere, they were captivated by
primitivism and folk cultures; in African masks, folk music, peasant
culture they thought to have discovered the sense of personal
wholeness and communal rootedness that they felt to be so woefully
lacking in the modern world.
Three strands of the counter-culture
At the centre of Budapest’s radical counter-culture were three
individuals, each of whom represented a distinctive intellectual or
political pole of attraction for Karl Polanyi. One, Georg Luka´cs, lived
on the same street and was a good friend of both Karl and his mother.
In his youth, Luka´cs was more a philosophical than a political radical.
A metaphysical idealist, he found in Romantic philosophy pointers
towards an intellectual and cultural renaissance, and was fiercely crit-
ical of what he saw as the insipid stultifying staples of 19th century
liberal philosophy: utilitarianism, positivism, materialism, and de-
terminism. He learnt much from vitalist and neo-Kantian phi-
losophers who, in various ways, emphasized the distinction between
the methods of the natural and the social sciences, between the ob-
jective world studied by science and the subjective reality of individual
consciousness and social existence. At a 1910 meeting of the Galilei
Circle – of which Polanyi was the founder – Luka´cs expounded upon
the toxic cocktail of positivism, determinism and liberal individual-
ism, how these acted to dissolve social bonds and attenuate the
43 Sayre and L€owy 2001, pp. 70-71. 44 Gluck 1985, p. 7.
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intellectual basis for conscious human action. In his perspective, as
explicated by Mary Gluck,
it was ultimately positivistic science which was responsible for the fragmented,
relativistic world view bequeathed by the nineteenth century to the twentieth.
Positivism, he felt, approached nature from a position of passive observation
rather than active involvement, and encouraged a view of the world geared to
register the reality of atomized individuals and dispersed, disconnected
movements.45
Luka´cs’ greatest enthusiasms, alongside Dostoevsky and the
Hungarian poet Endre Ady, were German and French philosophers
and sociologists: Nietzsche, Bergson, Dilthey, Simmel and Weber. But
there was also one home-grown theorist, Ervin Szabo, to whom he was
greatly indebted.46 Szabo, Hungary’s leading Marxist theoretician,
was also a major influence on Polanyi – indeed, the latter’s wife would
later describe him as ‘‘our spiritual father.’’47
A revolutionary syndicalist, Szabo was sharply critical of the
programme and practice of the Social Democratic Party. It was, he
said, controlled by union bureaucrats and engaged in ‘‘timid parlia-
mentarism.’’48 The theory that sanctioned such behaviour was
Lassallean rather than Marxist: a deterministic ‘‘objective sociology’’
that denied the role in history of ideas, of human psychology.49 ‘‘All
historical development,’’ he would insist, ‘‘has been the result of the
actions of critical individuals.’’50 Every individual, he declared in
a speech to the Galilei Circle, has an active part to play, and not least
‘‘in seiner eigenen Seelen- und Gef€uhlswelt.’’51 In Syndicalism and
Social Democracy, published in 1908, Szabo proposed that the workers’
movement establish its categorical independence from the bourgeoisie,
insisting that freedom, passion and the flourishing of the worker’s
human potential are of greater consequence than the construction of
mere institutions, even including those of a future socialist State.
Intellectually and politically, Polanyi was closer to Szabo than to
Luka´cs, and he kept abreast of the progress of the syndicalist
phenomenon around Europe. Another of his cousins, Od€on Por, was
active in syndicalist movements in Italy, and Polanyi also followed the
course of the Great Unrest (sometimes called the Syndicalist Revolt)
in Britain. He was familiar with the work of G. K. Chesterton, took
approving note of his radical proposals for redistribution of
45 Ibid., p. 140.
46 LukA´cs 1983, pp. 39-40.
47 Vezer 2000, p. 283.
48 T€okes 1967, p. 10.
49 Szabo 1982, p. 109.
50 LitvA´n and Bak 1982, p. 8.
51 HorvA´th 1966, p. 498.
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productive property and land, and translated the first chapter of his
Heretics into Hungarian.52 Chesterton was the editor of Eye-Witness
and a contributor to New Age, the principal journals of cultural
rebellion in Britain at the time; (the latter carried an enthusiastic piece
by Por about the ‘‘national guilds’’ – co-operatives – of Emilio
Romana and Ravenna.) The brunt of Chesterton’s interpretation of
the Great Unrest was that it was directed against collectivism –
including the encroaching ‘‘servile state’’ and statist forms of social-
ism.53 He was, however, close friends with a prominent statist
socialist, and one of Polanyi’s life-long idols and the subject of one
of his earliest published essays, the dramatist George Bernard Shaw.
Statist, Fabian socialism formed the third pole of attraction in the
Budapest counter-culture, and was the one to which Polanyi was most
strongly drawn. It was the creed of Shaw, of his other teenage idol, H.
G. Wells, and of Oszka´r Ja´szi and his friend Eduard Bernstein. The
latter had broken from the mainstream of the German SPD – refusing
its philosophy of history, economic determinism, lack of separate
ethical agenda, and theory of crisis – to become a ‘‘bourgeois radical’’
of a Fabian stripe.54 For him, capitalism was not moving towards
collapse, and if the position of workers was becoming intolerable this
was due to the uncertainty of their existence in a volatile environment
and not to any sustained tendency to depress their living standards.55
The method by which to expand working-class influence within
society was not class struggle and certainly not revolutionary upheaval
but the broadening of the franchise. Together with Achille Loria,
Franz Oppenheimer and Eugen D€uhring he inspired the Central
European current of ‘‘liberal socialism,’’ a movement, to which Ja´szi
and Polanyi both signed up. Alongside democratization, it was
dedicated to ending the exploitative character of capitalism, a task
that liberal socialists believed would be achieved with the abolition of
the latifundia system and the opening to all of the opportunity to own
land.
Ja´szi was very much the ‘‘anti-aristocratic’’ radical in the sense
described by Norman Stone above. Radicalism’s mission, he believed,
was to breathe new life into a liberalism that had become discredited
through its association with ‘‘Manchesterism’’ (the advocacy of free
trade as a means of entrenching the dominance of the strong, cynically
52 45-11, Abraham Rotstein (1957) ‘‘Notes
of Weekend XV with Karl Polanyi’’, pp. 18,
39.
53 Villis 2006, p. 42.
54 Schumpeter 1986, p. 883.
55 The resemblance of the latter claim to
arguments in Polanyi’s The Great Transfor-
mation may not be entirely accidental.
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disguised by the vocabulary of liberty).56 In sharp contrast to Szabo
he exhorted radicals to pledge themselves to ‘‘industrial capital’’ in its
battle against ‘‘agrarian feudalism,’’57 and to rescue ‘‘the part of
classical liberalism that is still viable today’’ – by which he meant
tolerance, civil liberties, parliamentary democracy, and free trade, but
not laissez-faire or even, necessarily, private property in the means of
production.58 Ja´szi’s faith in natural science and positivist social
science was fervent, and it is telling that he held Herbert Spencer in
the highest regard, yet he insisted upon the privileged role of ideas as
the switching points of social change – especially where they are
discussed and developed collectively within the public sphere and
educational institutions. The goal to which he aspired was the
replacement of the decaying old religious and metaphysical ethics by
a ‘‘new morality, founded on science and human solidarity.’’59 The
way towards that goal involved grounding political reform upon
social-scientific knowledge. ‘‘We believed,’’ he was later to recall,
in the power of ideas; we believed in the limitless optimism of the theory of
progress; in the invincible strength of truth; in the weakness of the debauched
‘‘ancien regime’’; and above all, we believed in the importance of spreading our
noble, simple, and clear principles among our fellow men. We were rationalist,
anticorruptionist knights errant . . . who, with the diamond-tipped lances of our
utilitarian truths, carried on proud, solitary guerrilla warfare against the
thousand-year-old bastion of feudalism and clericalism.60
Their differences notwithstanding, Luka´cs and Szabo viewed Ja´szi’s
group as firm and unconditional allies in a shared rebellion against
feudal absolutism and its Liberal props. The three currents – Romantic
anti-capitalist, dissident Marxist, and liberal socialist – converged
around a set of overlapping centres of influence, of which the most
notable were the literary review Nyugat (‘‘West’’), Ja´szi’s Sociological
Society and its journal Huszadik Sza´zad (‘‘Twentieth Century’’), and
the Galilei Circle, with its periodical Szabadgondolat (‘‘Free Thought’’).
In Polanyi’s mind, the schism between Romantic anti-capitalism
and Ja´szi’s pragmatic, positivist reformism resonated, one would
imagine, with two other interlinked cleavages: between the political-
cultural outlook of his parents, and between Britain and Russia. His
father, an engineer, businessman, positivist and Liberal, had lived for
a time in Edinburgh (where he studied techniques of building railways
across city centres) and returned to Budapest ‘‘as what he understood
56 Congdon 1974, pp. 304-305.
57 HorvA´th 1966, p. 293.
58 LitvA´n 2006, p. 164.
59 Kettler et al. 1984, p. 20; HorvA´th
1966, p. 135.
60 Gluck 1985, p. 104.
114
gareth dale
to be a practising Scotsman.’’61 The model he held up ‘‘was
Englishness, which he identified with modernity.’’62 Britain, for Karl,
was the land of his father’s tales, of his English language education, of
J. S. Mill and New Liberalism, of utopian socialism and Fabianism,
and of his life-long idols Robert Owen and George Bernard Shaw. His
mother, by contrast, was bohemian and chaotic; her interests leaned to
the aesthetic and the psychoanalytic. She would chide Ja´szi, as he
recalls, for his ‘‘narrow, Spencerian, English positivism’’ and recom-
mend that he ‘‘balance it with Nietzsche’s brilliance.’’63 Of Russian
descent, Cecile maintained links to Russian emigre circles, above all
through her close friend Samuel Klatschko. A Russian socialist and
former narodnik, Klatschko had, in early life, founded a utopian
community in the US and later provided a Viennese base for exiled
Russian revolutionaries (including Trotsky and Radek). He exerted
a lasting influence on both Karl Polanyi and Ervin Szabo. From him,
Karl developed a fascination with the Russian student movement, and
‘‘lived with the image of the self-sacrificing, man-of-the-movement’’
in his mind. Russia was the land of populism, of revolutionary spirit,
and of those literary avatars of romantic anti-capitalism, Dostoevsky
and Tolstoy.
Of the thinkers presented above as leading figures of the three strands
of Budapest’s counter-culture, Polanyi was closest to Ja´szi, and has been
described as one of his ‘‘most faithful followers.’’64 Yet, already in his
earliest writings one can discern Romantic and syndicalist overtones and,
in the 1910s, he began to develop his own distinctive voice. Marking
a critical juncture in his intellectual formation was his encounter with the
writings of Guild Socialists, notably G. D. H. Cole. Guild Socialism was
the product of an unlikely coalescence of Fabianism, medievalist
aestheticism and syndicalism – a trinity which, if transposed onto the
Hungarian counter-culture maps quite precisely to Ja´szi, Luka´cs and
Szabo. Initiated during the Great Unrest it was sometimes referred to as
‘‘English syndicalism,’’ where ‘‘English’’ connoted opposition to abrupt
change and saturation in the culture of liberalism. As its most famous
adherent, Bertrand Russell, put it, whereas the Syndicalists accept, from
Marx, the doctrine of class war and, from Anarchism, the immediate
abolition of political power, ‘‘the Guild Socialists, though some persons
61 Duczynska 2000, p. 303; Szapor 2005,
p. 15.
62 Kari Polanyi-Levitt, telephone inter-
view with the author, 08.11.2007.
63 Kadarkay 1991, p. 89.
64 Congdon 1991, p. 18; Kari Polanyi-
Levitt, telephone interview with the author,
06.10.2007.
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in this country regard them as extremists, really represent the English
love of compromise.’’65 To Polanyi, Guild Socialism embodied the
meeting point between ‘‘England’’ and ‘‘Russia,’’ between reformism
and Romantic anti-capitalism, parliamentary democracy and workers’
self-government, father and mother.
From theory to practice
The moral, cultural and political transformation in which Polanyi,
Ja´szi, Luka´cs et al. invested their hopes and energies would, if
successful, overcome the alienation and identity conflict described in
the first part of this essay. No longer would society be fractured along
lines of education. The franchise would be extended to all and the
oppression of the minority nations would be brought to an end. The
gulf between classes would be reduced or eliminated, and in the pulse
of this progressive sea-change the primary causes of anti-Semitism
would dissolve. In a radical or revolutionary Hungary the counter-
culture would become the mainstream. But how were the critics’ ideas
to be turned into reality? How might those sharply honed intellectual
resources of the counter-culture be put to practical effect? In this
section I turn to examine how Polanyi engaged with this challenge, by
exploring his practical activities and political engagement in the run-
up to and immediate aftermath of the First World War.
In 1908-1914, Polanyi’s major efforts lay with the Galilei Circle,
a Freemason-funded organization, over 2,000 strong, of students and
young intellectuals.66 Its mission was to overcome Hungary’s back-
wardness and inspire national moral regeneration; its enemies were
clericalism, corruption, bureaucracy and the privileged elites who
resisted its aims: the establishment of an open liberal (or socialist)
society with a modern education system and generously defined and
robustly defended academic and scientific freedoms.67 Within this
broad remit a number of specific agendas were identified. Polanyi, for
example, saw research in rural sociology as an important task; the
Galileists, he believed, should follow the Russian student movement that
had gone ‘‘out to the villages’’ to meet the people.68 A higher priority was
65 Russell 1918, p. 124.
66 30-1, ‘‘Karl Polanyi: Biographical in-
formation, 1940-1984.’’
67 29-12, Ilona Duczynska n.d. ‘‘Karl
Polanyi (1886-1964) – A family chronicle
and a short account of his life.’’
68 MU´csi 1990, p. 27.
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in the pedagogic field: between its foundation in 1908 and its pro-
hibition in 1917 the Galilei Circle organized thousands of adult
education classes that were attended by tens of thousands of working
people.69 But if it possessed one defining task, it was to introduce and
disseminate cutting-edge scientific, cultural and social-scientific thought
to the Budapest intelligentsia. Alongside Ernst Mach and Richard
Avenarius, and Marxist and other socialist theorists, the Galileists
engaged above all with the ideas of Albert Einstein, Herbert Spencer
and Sigmund Freud.70 The keynote speakers were often home grown
(e.g. Polanyi and Luka´cs) or Austrian (Max Adler), but an impres-
sive assortment of foreigners came too, including Eduard Bernstein,
Roberto Michels, Wilhelm Ostwald and Werner Sombart.
The Galilei Circle was principally a scholarly enterprise, but Polanyi
was simultaneously engaged in overtly political activity, producing
strategic discussion papers for and participating in the creation of
a political party. Variously translated as ‘‘National Citizens Radical
Party’’ and ‘‘Radical Bourgeois Party,’’ for Polanyi the operative term
was ‘‘radical.’’ In the meaning he gives it, radicalism ‘‘views the world
from within and recognizes in human progress its own work,’’ in contrast
to Marxism, which ‘‘views the world from without,’’ and imagines social
development to be ‘‘a pure automatism, propelled by the machinery of
the class struggle.’’71 Radicalism was also to be contrasted with
traditional liberalism, a current that had forsaken its rebellious past.
He was dismayed that Hungarian liberals, in shameful contrast to their
forebears in 1848, were pusillanimous in the face of clerical conserva-
tism. Why had liberalism lost its vitality, he wondered; why had it
foresworn all revolutionary initiative and become a reactionary move-
ment? The answer he found lay not in material developments – such as
the ascendancy of liberalism’s chosen economic system, capitalism, or
the threat to private property in the means of production posed by the
rise of organized labour – but in a ‘‘new, mistaken and disastrous idea’’
that had gripped the social sciences and radical politics alike.72 The new
idea was ‘‘political fatalism,’’ the ‘‘blind belief in the constant de-
velopment of society as the solution to all of society’s problems’’ with its
concomitant relegation of political action to a mere handservant of that
development.73 Infected with this spirit liberalism had abandoned any
69 30-1 (op. cit.). See also Mendell 1994,
p. 25.
70 29-12 (op. cit.); 30-1 (op. cit.); 46-6, Ilona
Duczynska (1970s) Interview with Ilona
Duczynska by Dr. Isabella Ackerl.
71 Quoted in Congdon 2001, p. 37.
72 1-12, Karl Polanyi (1913) ‘‘Speech on
the meaning of conviction.’’
73 1-13, Karl Polanyi, ‘‘A lesson learned.’’
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serious fight against the rule of the large landowners and the Church,
and although Social Democracy had at least taken up the campaign to
extend the franchise, for the most part it was in the grip of its own
immobilizing fatalistic doctrines.
By what means could radical Hungary be shaken out of its torpor?
What was required in order to re-kindle the spirit of 1848? On the
intellectual front the task was clear: to combat fatalism. But what of
the political front? Here, matters were more complex, and to grasp
Polanyi’s views and strategic proposals it is first necessary to compre-
hend his class analysis of contemporary Hungarian politics. In his
judgment, the Hungarian state, even though it had presided over rapid
industrialization and a burgeoning and confident bourgeoisie, remained
dominated by landowning interests and the Church and was therefore
fundamentally a feudal institution. The upper bourgeoisie was repre-
sented by the powerful Liberal party, and the rapidly expanding
manual-industrial working class by the Social Democratic Party, but
in the intervening space a ‘‘new middle class’’ had come into being,
encompassing white collar workers, private and public officials, and the
intelligentsia (including, for example, priests, actors and academics).74
In this, Polanyi was picking up a theory that had been developed in the
1890s by the German Historical Schoolmen Gerhard von Schultze-
G€avernitz, Gustav Schmoller and Sombart, and popularized by
Bernstein. To my mind, Polanyi’s analysis, grouping as it does blue-
and white-collar workers together with the upper middle-class practi-
tioners of ‘‘mental labour’’ as a single stratum, obfuscates matters, and
no less confusing is his use of diverse, even contradictory, labels to refer
to it, including ‘‘intelligentsia,’’ ‘‘intellectual class,’’ ‘‘intellectual work-
ers’’ and ‘‘bourgeois.’’ Be that as it may, the inferences he drew were
clear: that the two ‘‘classes,’’ although inextricably united in their
destiny were innately different in their nature, the manual worker being
‘‘necessarily materialist’’ and concerned above all with economic
matters ‘‘while the intellectual worker is necessarily idealist.’’75 This
difference in character and outlook necessitated their separate organi-
zation into bourgeois-radical and social-democratic parties.
In an anticipation of his later turn towards functionalist theory,
Polanyi maintained that the essential cause of the crisis of progressive
Hungary was that Social Democracy had trespassed on the functions
proper to bourgeois radicals, and it had been able to do so in part
74 Polanyi 1918.
75 1-25, Karl Polanyi (1918) ‘‘A radikaliz-
mus programmja es celja.’’
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because the latter were politically homeless, with no party to call their
own. For taking up the struggle for parliamentary democracy and for
‘‘entrenching radical bourgeois ideas within progressive public opin-
ion’’ Polanyi was deeply appreciative of the Social Democrat-led
struggles of Hungarian labour, but in so doing it had stolen the clothes
of bourgeois radicalism.76 For their part, a good many members of the
‘‘extreme left wing of the bourgeoisie’’ had backed the Social-
Democrats’ campaign for democracy, but such support had become
‘‘empty with the passing of time.’’77 In short, neither the intelligentsia
nor the industrial proletariat had shown itself capable of fulfilling its
proper vocation; only a coalition of manual and mental labour,
organized separately but acting together on the critical question of
democratization, could come to the rescue of Hungary (and indeed,
Polanyi believed, of human society).
In a raft of articles and speeches in the run-up to the First World
War Polanyi argued for a loose association between Social Democracy
and bourgeois radicalism. It would be based upon a division of labour
with regard to constituency – on one hand, the working class, on the
other, radical elements of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia together
with minority nationalities and the peasantry – and with regard to
long-term ends: ‘‘Bourgeois politics and the struggle against feudalism
will be carried out by the radicals, while the working class movement
and the struggle against capitalism will be represented by the social-
ists.’’78 The area of common ground would consist of the immediate
goals towards which the actual activities of both parties would be
oriented: the overthrow of feudalism and clericalism and the expan-
sion of the franchise. Taking a position vis-a`-vis the middle-class
intelligentsia analogous to that of Gramsci towards the working class,
Polanyi made a case for its hegemonic role within a broad democratic
bloc: ‘‘A new world-view has to be created that ensures the leadership
of the intellectual forces on the basis of democracy . . . The road for
the proletariat leads through the goals of bourgeois radicalism.’’79
This strategy, Polanyi believed, held out terrific promise for
a progressive Hungary. The formation of an intellectual middle-class
party that was prepared to ‘‘besiege the fortress of feudalism out
of bourgeois interests and with bourgeois forces’’ would arouse the
latter from their stupour and hoist the bourgeoisie back onto its
76 Polanyi 1914b.
77 Polanyi 1913.
78 1-23, op. cit.
79 Polanyi 1913; 1-25, Karl Polanyi
(1918) ‘‘A radikalizmus programmja es
celja.’’
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emancipatory track. It would at last create a platform within Parlia-
ment that would provide serious and genuine opposition to the rule of
the landowners and the Church, in the process ensuring that the axis
of public life would swivel such that ‘‘the struggle between forces of
progress and reaction’’ would thenceforth take centre stage.80 For the
labour-movement organizations, too, the creation of a Radical Party
could not but be beneficial, for in place of well-meaning intellectual
advisors they would gain a strong middle-class ally – to the support of
which they should, Polanyi advised, pledge their unconditional
commitment.81
Polanyi’s strategic thinking was developed in close conference with
Oszkar Ja´szi, and when he set up the Radical Bourgeois Party in June
1914, Polanyi was installed as its General Secretary.82 The core points
of the party’s programme were the extension of the franchise, land
redistribution, free trade, education reform, and federalization. The
last of these points, aimed at assuaging the demands for autonomy of
the minority nationalities whilst maintaining the borders of Greater
Hungary, was seen by conservatives and anti-Semites as a cosmopol-
itan plot to undermine ‘‘Magyardom,’’ yet if the radicals’ nationalities
policy deserves criticism it is, on the contrary, for being insufficiently
appreciative of the oppressions inflicted upon the minority nations. Of
the two chief arguments that Polanyi deployed in justification of the
case for federalism, one was that in its absence the nationalities would
be tempted to ally themselves with absolutism against democracy in
order to block the formation of a Magyar-dominated state, but the
other, although avowedly democratic in inspiration, was brazenly,
even arrogantly, nationalistic. ‘‘It is only the Magyars in this country,’’
he declaimed,
who have reached the threshold of democratic statehood, and the new, modern
Hungary can only be built by their forces. This process will be a veritable
manifestation of the cultural hegemony that underpins Magyar political
hegemony, that real ‘‘leadership’’ which is based not on force and fraud but
on economic welfare and intellectual prowess. Hungary will accomplish this
democratic solution in accordance with its essence: so that it applies to Magyars
and non-Magyars alike, and, if necessary, against the desires of the
nationalities.83
The Radical Bourgeois Party did not live up to Polanyi’s hopes.
Clearly, the inauspicious date of its foundation – June 1914 – did not
help. But there were deeper reasons too. Although programmatically
80 1-23, op. cit.
81 Polanyi 1913.




committed to an alliance with the peasantry and minority nationali-
ties, in practice it failed to reach beyond its core constituency in the
left and left-liberal intelligentsia. Quite simply, according to Ja´szi, it
‘‘was of too intellectual a type’’ to gain mass support.84 In Gluck’s
harsher judgment, Ja´szi, Polanyi and their colleagues were the
epitome of ‘‘a fastidious intellectual elite who were, on occasion, glad
to give lectures for the edification of working-class audiences; were
more than ready to theorize about the ‘‘proletariat’’ as an abstraction’’
while remaining essentially ignorant of and indifferent toward the
concrete, individual manifestations of working-class and peasant
life.85
The moment for the radicals to attempt to break out of their niche
did arrive, in autumn 1918, with the ‘‘White Aster Revolution.’’ The
genesis of that upheaval can be traced to December 1917, when
workers’ councils were established in factories and a network of them
swiftly spread.86 The first half of 1918 witnessed a general strike,
scores of wildcat strikes, and revolts in the barracks.87 Amid worsen-
ing social conditions and with defeat in war looming the political
mood, as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, swung sharply
towards republicanism, social democracy and communism. The
Zeitgeist is captured well in Ja´szi’s memoirs:
The spirit of revolution had penetrated into every sphere of human relations in
the course of September and October. Men lost all interest in everyday affairs
and were looking fixedly into the future. . . . An electrician’s apprentice, come to
repair the wires, prophesied that we were on the threshold of revolution and
appalling events. The maid bringing in the soup told us that she had it from her
relatives in the country that the old world would last very little longer now. The
young men of the Galileo Club pursued their anti-militarist propaganda almost
openly, and the imprisonment of a few of them only increased their revolution-
ary enthusiasm. Soldiers and even officers spoke aloud in public of the collapse
of the front. In the tram one heard passionate outbursts against the war, the
authorities and the propertied classes.88
In the early autumn, the Social Democrats joined forces with the
Radical Bourgeois Party and Count Michael Ka´rolyi to form the
‘‘Hungarian National Council’’ (HNC). In October, Ka´rolyi, whose
aim was a peaceful and orderly transition to liberal democracy, warned
the Parliament in Budapest and the Emperor in Vienna that Hungary
faced the choice between an HNC-led government and Bolshevism.
84 JA´szi 1924, p. 75.
85 Gluck 1985, p. 102.
86 T€okes 1967, p. 39.
87 DeA´k 1971, p. 28.
88 JA´szi 1924, p. 29.
121
political experiences of polanyi in budapest
When neither legislators nor monarch responded to this threat, the
Social Democrats – by far the strongest component of the HNC –
sought to entrench their bargaining position by appealing to the
workers and soldiers to act. The response exceeded their expectations,
and indeed took them utterly by surprise: a wave of street demon-
strations, strikes and mutinies hoisted them into power.89 If the
HNC’s intention had been a ‘‘negotiated transition’’ to democracy,
the reality was ‘‘ruptura.’’
In its initial phase, the Aster Revolution was characterized by the
sense of unity that typifies the first stages of revolutions in which the
working and middling layers of society band together against an
autocratic regime. Ja´szi’s memoirs record his elation at the unity
between classes and between nationalities that arose during those
spirited days.90 I have little doubt that Polanyi felt the same, and he,
like Ja´szi, also drew attention to the critical role played by Galileists.
Thus, although he awards the plaudits for the revolt’s success first and
foremost to ‘‘the leaders whose foresight and courage made it possible
for a new democratic Hungary to rally round their persons’’ and,
secondly, to ‘‘the revolutionary discipline of the Hungarian masses,’’
he credits the ‘‘fervour and the integrity of the revolution,’’ and its
‘‘shining, unblemished nature’’ to the ‘‘students’ movement ‘‘Galilei,’’
which had raised a generation devoted to the idea of public obliga-
tion.’’91 Nevertheless, the Aster episode did not fulfill Polanyi’s
expectations, let alone his hopes, and for this, in a mea culpa written
some ten years later, he pinned part of the blame upon the Galilei
Circle. The problem, as he saw it in retrospect, had lain with the
Galileists’ privileging of the sphere of ideas over political engagement.
‘‘Ich war davon furchtbar niedergedr€uckt,’’ he recalls, ‘‘weil dort
lauter Seminare gelaufen sind, lauter Soziologie, lauter gelehrte
Sachen statt Aktion.’’92 It was due to the failings of the Galilei Circle,
that there was not available in 1918 a generation, welded in one with the
peasantry and with the national minorities in long-standing, stern battles. I had
been leading the Circle in an anti-political direction. Neither with the working
class, nor with the peasantry, nor with the national minorities did I try to achieve
unity based on action.
‘‘I have never been a politician,’’ he added, not without a soupc¸on
of hyperbole; ‘‘I had no talent that way, no interest even.’’93
89 KA´rolyi 1924, p. 443.
90 JA´szi 1924, p. 34.
91 Polanyi 1929; 1946, p. 97.
92 46-6, op. cit.
93 30-1, op. cit.
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From Ka´rolyi to Kun
If the HNC government experienced a honeymoon period it was
not to last for more than a few weeks and its demise was predictable –
Ka´rolyi was widely seen as playing Kerensky’s role in Hungary’s
rendition of the Russian revolution.94 The new administration’s first
step was to autonomously sign an armistice with the Allies, breaking
from Vienna in the process, but it immediately found itself in troubled
waters. Although committed to gradual reforms within a liberal
framework, it had been hoisted to power by mass movements, with
strong bases of support within the army, that were pressing for swift
and wholesale changes that went beyond the limits of parliamentary-
democratic capitalism. In Budapest a potential rival power had arisen
in the form of the soldiers’ and workers’ councils. In the countryside,
peasants agitated for land redistribution. On the perimeter, national
minorities were moving to secede.
The initial euphoria notwithstanding, the unity for which Polanyi
yearned was hardly to be realized under Ka´rolyi’s provisional
government. Instead, social polarization ensued. On one side, the
old ruling classes mobilized against the incoming government. (‘‘As
there had been scarcely any social welfare in the past,’’ Ka´rolyi’s wife,
Catherine, recalls in her memoirs, ‘‘the mildest measures could irritate
and alarm the ruling classes.’’95) On the other, movements of workers
and peasants, their political confidence raised thanks to the central
part they played in the Aster Revolution, pressed for further demands:
land redistribution, improvements to pay and conditions, and socialist
economic policies. According to Ka´rolyi, his government did its level
best to dampen the demands of the ‘‘popular classes’’ while displaying
the utmost magnanimity to the bishops, counts, princes and bank
directors. ‘‘We were,’’ he reflected with the benefit of hindsight,
‘‘bitterly to regret this generous attitude.’’96
Despite the widespread goodwill that Ka´rolyi’s government had
earned by signing the armistice and extending the franchise (to men
over 21 and women over 24), few constituencies felt that their
demands were being met. ‘‘Vested interests, doctrinaire prejudice
and urban indifference’’97 – by which Polanyi referred to the land-
owners, the Church and Social Democracy – ensured that the
government procrastinated over its promise of land reform. It divided
94 Congdon 1974, p. 310.
95 KA´rolyi 1966, p. 195.
96 KA´rolyi 1956, p. 127.
97 Polanyi 1946.
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up a mere handful of large estates, including Ka´rolyi’s own, as
compared to scores that were occupied ‘‘from below.’’ Citing ‘‘the
general lack of energy of the government and its indifference to the
progress of the revolution,’’ Ja´szi resigned his cabinet position in
January.98 In February, liberal values were thrown overboard when,
following an unsuccessful attempt to expel Communists from the
trade unions and workers’ councils, the cabinet authorized the round-
ing up and imprisonment of leaders and cadre of the fledgling
Communist Party and banned its newspaper. Its leader, Bela Kun,
was beaten up in prison in the presence of a newspaper journalist,
whose report caused ‘‘a wave of sympathy for the Bolsheviks [to
sweep] over the capital’’ – a sentiment that embraced an increasingly
disenchanted Karl Polanyi.99 The incarceration of the Communists,
he observed, was causing people who were otherwise unsympathetic
to Communism to think that there might be a degree of truth in their
views. And with the masses, he opined, not without a hint of elitism,
‘‘a partial truth means the truth.’’100
Until February 1919, Polanyi had regarded the HNC regime as his
own. However, he bemoaned its lack of a ‘‘clear and feasible political
programme’’ (a fault for which, as we noted above, he blamed himself,
for neglecting to shape the Galilei Circle into a hot-house to cultivate
a revolutionary intelligentsia skilled in political campaigning and
administration).101 Of the Ka´rolyi government he demanded ‘‘more
determination . . . against every breath of the counter-revolution,’’ the
acceleration ‘‘of the economic construction of socialism,’’ a retreat
from its protectionist economic policies, and an end to its ‘‘chauvinist
attitude in the nationalities question.’’102 Although he backed the
HNC in its rivalry with the Communists, in December he – in
possibly the first such initiative in Central and Eastern Europe –
initiated a debate on Bolshevism in his journal Szabadgondolat and, at
his request, the first to air their views, alongside Ja´szi, were Georg
Luka´cs, who was at the time moving rapidly into the Communist
camp, and the Communist Eugene Varga. His own contribution,
although caustically critical of Bolshevism, did credit it with being
‘‘the only serious representative of socialism.’’103
By March 1919 the Ka´rolyi government found itself under attack
from Czech-Slovak, Serb and Romanian armies, and was ordered by
98 JA´szi 1924.








the French government to withdraw its forces to the borders drawn up
by the victorious powers at Versailles. It was simultaneously under
pressure from the masses, with peasants seizing land, workers taking
strike action in support of the imprisoned Communists, and a Soviet
assuming control of the southern provincial capital of Szeged. ‘‘The
hold of Bolshevism was greatly strengthened,’’ according to Ja´szi, ‘‘by
the growth throughout the country of counter-revolutionary move-
ments,’’ a development for which he held the Ka´rolyi government
responsible, for it had permitted the chief conspirators among the
Whites ‘‘to continue their work undisturbed.’’ In view of the palpable
reality of counter-revolutionary movements, which the HNC govern-
ment failed to confront,
Revolutionary Hungary stood in fear and trembling; it was generally felt that
[the Ka´rolyi] government was no longer able to save the October Revolution;
and if a choice had to be made between White and Red . . . the Red was
preferred.104
With his authority crumbling, Ka´rolyi resigned and handed the
reins of power to the Social Democrats. Yet they too were in disarray.
Support for Communism was surging, especially amongst soldiers and
workers, and entire sections of the Social Democratic Party, including
its Youth League, went over. Of those that remained an important part
sought rapprochement with – or, more accurately, co-optation of – the
CP. In this manoeuvre, international considerations played a critical
role, given the belief in the SDP’s leading ranks that before long the
Russian Red Army would break through Romanian lines and reach
Hungary’s eastern borders. ‘‘We must take . . . from the East what has
been denied to us by the West,’’ declared one SDP leader, explaining
his party’s ‘‘left’’ turn;
The army of the Russian proletariat is approaching rapidly. A bourgeois
government . . . will not be able to cope with these new developments. . . . the
Communist comrades immediately must be released from prison and tomorrow
. . . we shall announce to the entire world that the proletariat of this country has
taken the guidance of Hungary and at the same time offered its fraternal alliance
to the Soviet Russian government.105
This was an act of desperation, writes John Rees, and one that
‘‘depended on the stupidity, inexperience, and gullibility of the CP
leadership it if was to work. Unfortunately, these were qualities that
Bela Kun and his comrades possessed in abundance.’’ By agreeing to
the fusion – and against advice from Moscow – the Communists
104 JA´szi 1924, p. 88. 105 Rees 1998, pp. 254-255.
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entered government. Although both the new government and Party
were led by Bela Kun, his comrades took a minority of the senior
positions in both institutions.
Initially at least, the Councils Republic was not lacking in popularity.
According to Ja´szi, normally an implacable critic, the first months of
1919 witnessed ‘‘the complete conversion of the masses to Bolshevism,’’
and a positive disposition towards the new regime among the bulk of the
intelligentsia as well.106 The Republic, Ja´szi continued,
maintained a measure of order and organisation during a period in which there
was no alternative to it but the horrors and anarchy of mob domination. . . . It
planted in the minds of the great mass of semi-brutalised slaves perhaps the first
seeds of faith and hope of liberation; to this day there lives in the hearts of
millions the sense of the rights of the workers and of their superiority to the
drones and idlers. Above all, the dictatorship shook out of their age-long apathy
the unhappy helots of Hungarian society, the agricultural workers. No less
important was the service of the Soviet Republic to the idea of internationalism,
made vivid and real in the minds of the people by the memory of hard and
bloody conflicts. Finally, . . . the Republic did pioneer work for the ideals of more
advanced types of democracy and self-government.107
A portion of its popularity, in addition, related to the Entente’s
intention of reducing Hungary’s territory, with nationalists of all
political colours praying that the new regime would imbibe something
of Soviet Russia’s spirit in rejecting the impositions of the Great Powers.
The conditions that Kun’s ‘‘Republic of Councils’’ faced, includ-
ing economic collapse, food shortages and ongoing military attacks,
however, were as inclement as those endured by the Bolshevik-led
government in Russia. The communists within it were not only far
less experienced than their Russian mentors, but they had come to
power not by securing a majority in the workers’ and soldiers’ councils
but – and in this the Republic was an historical singularity – by
bureaucratic sleight of hand, in the form of fusion with an established
governing party. Polanyi viewed the handover, as one might expect,
with ambivalence. Although far from uncritical of the new govern-
ment, or indeed of the left Social Democrats for having abandoned
Ka´rolyi in favour of an alliance with Bolsheviks, he recognized that no
alternative regime could have been installed, and accepted an official
position in the People’s Commissariat of Social Production, a post
that he held for three months.108
Despite having ducked any formal appeal for popular approbation,
Kun’s government sought to institute that were policies even more
106 JA´szi 1924, pp. 38, 116.
107 Ibid., p. 151.




ambitious than its Russian ally. Although some of these were pioneer-
ing, notably in the fields of culture and education, in other areas
a series of policy decisions were taken that were either disastrously
overambitious or simply disastrous. Within weeks of assuming power,
and with little thought to the consequences, it nationalized over 20,000
businesses – a move that drew a sharp rebuke from Polanyi.109 It
expropriated the estates of the Hungarian aristocracy, but imple-
mented this by bureaucratic means and as the first stage in a pro-
gramme of forced collectivization rather than land redistribution. The
demands for autonomy or secession voiced by the national minorities,
were not conceded.
Domestically, as a result of these policy failures, opposition to the
Councils’ Republic grew. Yet the blows that actually brought it down
were delivered by foreign hands. Even before it could celebrate its first
month in office it faced an invasion by Romanian, Slovak and Czech
forces, backed by Western powers. Hungary’s ‘‘Red Army’’ was
pushed back almost to Budapest, where, in a remarkable turnaround,
it was reorganized, received an infusion of energy from the working-
class neighbourhoods, and pushed outward again on 2 May – on which
day Polanyi sent a message to Luka´cs to say ‘‘I am joining the
[Communist] Party’’ – in a triumphant campaign that saw it recapture
lost ground and push deep into Slovakia, where a ‘‘Soviet republic’’
was proclaimed in mid-June.110 This was, however, the last hurrah of
the Councils’ Republic. Under pressure from Paris to comply with the
terms of Versailles, and with its support amongst the peasantry
evaporating,111 the Red Army began its retreat and, after only 133
days in office, Kun’s government resigned. ‘‘The desperate but not
inglorious episode of the Commune,’’ as Polanyi referred to it, was
over.112 Power passed initially to the Social Democrats but was swiftly
usurped by the Romanian army. The Romanians and their French-
backed successor, the dictatorship under Miklos Horthy, instituted
a reign of terror in which thousands lost their lives – above all
communists, socialists and Jews. Fortunately for the Jewish socialist
Karl Polanyi, he had, already in June, reached the safety of Vienna.
109 2-9, ‘‘Politisch-historische Perspektive.’’
110 29-12, op. cit.
111 Polanyi criticized both the Social
Democrats (under Ka´rolyi and Kun alike)
and the Communists for neglecting ‘‘the
necessity for a radical redistribution of the
land’’ a mistake for which they paid ‘‘with
the easy victory of the counter-revolution,
which could count on a peasantry indifferent
to the cause of the workers.’’ 18-26, Karl
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Conclusion
Karl Polanyi had been a central figure in Budapest’s radical
counter-culture, the members of which were to exert an influence
upon 20th century thought that was out of all proportion to their
number. The radius of their social circle, moreover, was remarkably
short, as exemplified by the relationships between its four most
prominent figures: Polanyi was a cousin of his mentor Ja´szi’s close
friend Szabo, and a schoolmate, friend and neighbour of Luka´cs. For the
most part they hailed from and moved within a narrow layer of society:
the educated bourgeoisie of Jewish extraction. Their attempts to reach
out beyond that milieu – for example, through the Galilei Circle’s adult
education classes – were noteworthy but could not fundamentally alter
their experience of detachment. Like Szabo, Ja´szi and Luka´cs, Polanyi
believed that political and moral change in Hungary offered the prospect
of a society that would feel at ease with itself, and with which he would
feel in tune, but the movements in which he participated were incapable,
or only fleetingly capable, of realizing that goal. Those movements
reached their meridian in the revolutionary upheavals of 1918-19, after
which the counter-culture abruptly dispersed, with some of its number
remaining in Horthy’s Hungary while others – including Ja´szi, Luka´cs
and Polanyi – fled into exile.
More or less concurrently with its geographical dispersal, the
experience of war and revolution polarized the Budapest counter-culture
along political and intellectual faultlines – including the figures dis-
cussed in this essay (minus Szabo, who died in 1918). Ja´szi’s radicalism
evolved into a mainstream (and sternly anti-Marxist) liberalism. Luka´cs
engaged in a leap of faith, committing to Leninism in late 1918 before,
a decade or so later, accommodating to a reformist variant of Stalinism.
Polanyi, having been shaped by the overlapping dichotomies of ‘‘father
and mother,’’ ‘‘Britain and Russia,’’ and populist socialism and ratio-
nalist liberalism, resisted identifying himself with communism, liberal-
ism, or mainstream social democracy but searched for a ‘‘third way,’’
a form of society in which democracy could be extended into the
workplace without necessitating the complete abolition of markets.
Whether or not that project was feasible, it provided the core problem-
atique and the impetus behind those creative inquiries into economic
history and anthropology that were to establish Karl Polanyi’s reputa-
tion in the latter half of the 20th century, even while memories of
Budapest’s counter-culture were beginning to fade.
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Resume
Grand penseur et maıˆtre prestigieux, Karl
Polanyi a longtemps exerce une forte influence
dans plusieurs champs disciplinaires, princi-
palement sociologie economique et histoire
economique. Deux de ses apports, l’anthro-
pologie economique substantive et la the`se du
double mouvement se sont vues reconnaıˆtre
valeur pionnie`re. Cependant toute son œuvre
connue a ete ecrite tard dans sa vie, en exil et
on sait peu sur ses textes hongrois qui, pour la
plupart, n’avaient jusqu’alors pas ete traduits.
En depit de sa renommee, on a assez peu de
travaux biographiques sur lui, hormis quel-
ques brefs aperc¸us de qualite. L’article entend
remedier a` cette lacune en esquissant le ta-
bleau de cette extraordinaire conjonction his-
torico-geographique dans laquelle il s’est
forme et en explorant ses engagements intel-
lectuels et politiques dans le cercle Galilee et le
parti bourgeois radical. Au premier plan on
a le roˆle des questions touchant a` Nation,
Ethnicite et Classe dans la vie du jeune
Polanyi.
Mots cles : Karl Polanyi ; Hongrie ; Radica-
lisme liberal ; Assimilation juive.
Zusammenfassung
Vordenker und Leitfigur, Karl Polanyis
Beitr€age haben €uber lange Zeit zahlreiche
Disziplinen, vor allen Dingen die Wirt-
schaftssoziologie und -geschichte, beein-
flusst. Zwei seiner U¨berlegungen, die
substantive Wirtschaftsanthropologie und
die These der Doppelbewegung, sind Pio-
nierarbeiten. Im Gegensatz zu seinen Exil-
schriften sind seine ungarischen Arbeiten
kaum bekannt, da zum gr€oßten Teil bis
jetzt un€ubersetzt. Auch ist relativ wenig €uber
seine Person geschrieben worden, eine
L€ucke, die dieser Aufsatz schließen will. Im
Mittelpunkt steht das außergew€ohnliche Zu-
sammenspiel von Historie und Geographie,
dessen Zeitzeuge er war. Ebenso wird sein
intellektuelles und politisches Engagement im
Galilei-Kreis und der radikalen b€urgerlichen
Partei beleuchtet. Schwerpunkte sind Nation,
Ethnizit€at und Klasse im Leben des jungen
Karl Polanyi.
Schlagw€orter: Karl Polanyi; Ungarn; Libe-
raler Radikalismus; J€udische Assimilation.
130
gareth dale
